The UK's China Policy: Walking the Tightrope of Diplomacy

When Rishi Sunak was vying for the leadership of the Conservative party in the UK, he unabashedly labeled China as a "threat." Fast forward to the present, and the official stance of his government towards Beijing is one of "robust engagement." However, this shift hasn't been without controversy, with critics, including former Conservative party leader Iain Duncan Smith, branding it as "appeasement."

But let's not rush to judgment. It's essential to acknowledge that Britain, like other Western powers, cannot afford to wage a Cold War-style confrontation with China, akin to the old standoff with the Soviet Union. The reality is that China has become deeply intertwined with global supply chains, and disentangling from such a web would be a Herculean task.

Despite China's aggressive "wolf warrior" diplomacy, which has prompted Western nations to reconsider their reliance on China for critical infrastructure, it remains the UK's fourth-largest trading partner. Simply put, dialogue is imperative. It's not contradictory to promote commerce with a strategic competitor while simultaneously safeguarding sensitive technologies, but it demands agility and discernment.

However, as James Cleverly embarks on his historic visit to Beijing as the first British foreign secretary to do so in five years, it's crucial to address some hard questions raised by the government's critics.

The UK government, like its Western counterparts, has often displayed a degree of naivety in its dealings with Beijing. There was a prevailing belief that China's economic opening to the West and embrace of market principles would inevitably lead to political reform. This notion has a historical precedent—a similar fallacy during the Victorian and Edwardian era in which liberals like Norman Angell confidently asserted that war between Britain and Germany was impossible because of their deep economic ties. Yet, World War One ensued just four years after Angell's acclaimed work, "The Great Illusion."

The question now is whether the British government has internalized the lesson that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will always prioritize its interests over those of the Chinese people in any negotiation. From the Tiananmen Square massacre to Xi Jinping's current authoritarian crackdown, the CCP has consistently defined "pragmatism" or "realism" as a means to consolidate its power.

Once upon a time, some Tory leaders believed that London's financial hub, the City of London, could profit immensely by serving as China's gateway to the West. Eight years ago, Chancellor George Osborne even proclaimed a "golden era" in UK-China relations. However, China's actions, from disregarding the "one country, two systems" agreement on Hong Kong to its oppression of the Uyghur minority and belligerent posture toward Taiwan, have severely eroded the optimism surrounding free trade. Xi's iron-fisted approach at home has also hindered China's growth potential, as he prioritizes the CCP's dominance over allowing any challenge to its authority.

The hawks who warned against such unwavering optimism have valid concerns. The UK government's shift to a more China-skeptic policy was prompted by backbench rebellions within the ruling party and pressure from Washington, particularly regarding the involvement of Chinese company Huawei in British telecoms infrastructure.

In recent times, London has displayed greater resolve. The UK has offered sanctuary to hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens, dispatched Royal Navy vessels to the South China Sea, and patrolled the Taiwan Strait, signaling support for freedom of navigation. The Aukus defense agreement with Australia and the US further solidifies the UK's pivot to the Indo-Pacific, bolstered by its new membership in the trans-Pacific trading group, the CPTPP.

However, does the government's new China strategy cohesively address the multifaceted issues at play? Critics like former diplomat Charles Parton, who spent 22 years in or around China and Taiwan, aptly describe this as "the panda in the room." A House of Commons foreign affairs committee report has also highlighted the puzzling secrecy surrounding the Foreign Office's official strategy paper on China, which has been withheld from senior ministers and civil servants in other departments. This secrecy begs the question of how the government plans to formulate a coherent policy encompassing trade, climate change, security, and human rights concerns.

Foreign Secretary James Cleverly argues that failure to engage with China could be perceived as a sign of weakness, a valid point given the recent high-level visits by leaders from France, Germany, the European Union, and the United States. However, the concept of "weakness" cuts both ways, and Cleverly found himself in a difficult position when Chinese state authorities assaulted a human rights protester in Manchester, with no consequential response.

Looking ahead, the real test of British diplomacy lies in the future. China has expressed interest in joining the CPTPP, but the skepticism of current members, who have witnessed China flout the rules of the World Trade Organization, is palpable. The UK will play a crucial role in navigating this diplomatic minefield, and its approach will be a litmus test for the efficacy of its China strategy.

In conclusion, the UK's evolving stance on China is a delicate balancing act, influenced by shifting geopolitical dynamics and domestic considerations. The days of unwavering optimism in the power of commerce to liberalize China seem increasingly distant, replaced by a more cautious and skeptical approach. The challenges ahead are substantial, but they must be met with a nuanced and agile diplomacy that aligns with the UK's interests and values on the global stage.